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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In Sguros the husband's change in jobs was presented in the most fav-
orable light. He was a professional man seeking advancement and
entering a highly respected new career. The appellate record indicates
that the issue of good faith was not strongly contested.2 2 There was no
evidence offered to dispute his motive. But in future cases the question
might arise whether the change in jobs would have been made had
domestic harmony continued. If it were shown that the husband would
not have changed jobs but for the discord, then perhaps an award based
upon earning capacity would be sustained.
It is submitted that Conrad and Sguros are consistent and reason-
able. Both require that the intent of the husband be examined before
an award of alimony pendente lite may be based upon the husband's
earning capacity.23 In both the basic issue is the same, i.e., Is the
husband by changing jobs and reducing his income primarily moti-
vated by a desire to avoid his support obligations? If this issue is
answered affirmatively, the wife may be awarded alimony pendente
lite based upon the husband's earning capacity; otherwise the award
must be based upon his present earnings. This appears to be a reason-
able result, for the husband should not be absolutely prohibited from
changing jobs. And, at the same time, the wife's right to support
should not be infringed when the husband does change jobs primarily
for the purpose of reducing his income and thereby the amount of
support.2 4
G. DUDLEY HUMPHREY, JR.
Evidence-Inadmissibility of State-Seized Evidence in Federal
Criminal Prosecutions-Silver Platter Doctrine.
In Elkins v. United States1 defendants were indicted in a United
States district court in Oregon for violating and for conspiracy to vi-
olate the Federal Communications Act. Before trial the defendants
moved to suppress as evidence several recordings and a recording ma-
chine which had been seized by state officers and turned over to federal
officials. The state officers had seized the evidence during a search
22 See Brief for Appellee, p. 21.
2" "The award should be based on the amount which defendant is earning
when alimony is sought and the award made, if the husband is honestly engaged
in a business to which he is properly adapted and is in fact seeking to operate
his business profitably. Sguros v. Sguros, ante, 408. To base an award on
capacity to earn rather than actual earnings, there should be a finding based on
evidence that the husband was failing to exercise his capacity to earn because of
a disregard of his marital obligation to provide reasonable support for his
wife... ." Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, 418, 113 S.E.2d 912, 916 (1960).
(Emphasis added.)
" The same reasoning applies where a reduction in the husband's income has
occurred without a change in jobs.
1364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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which, two Oregon state courts had found, was unreasonable. The
district judge assumed without deciding that the search and seizure
were unlawful but relied on the "silver platter"2 doctrine and denied
the motion to suppress. At the trial the articles were admitted in evi-
dence, and the defendants were convicted. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions.8 Upon granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case to the district court. The Court held that evidence
was inadmissible in a federal criminal trial over the defendant's timely
objection 4 if it had been obtained by state officers during a search which,
if conducted by federal officers, would have been unreasonable under
the fourth amendment.
In dealing with the question of admissibility of relevant evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure the courts are confronted
with the problem of balancing conflicting social policies.5 If the courts
make use of all relevant evidence without regard to the manner in
which it is obtained, it is said that the criminal law can be more effec-
tively enforced.6 On the other hand, it is argued that exclusion of evi-
dence obtained during an unreasonable search is the only practical
method of deterring such police illegality.7  The Court in the principal
case indicated its awareness of this problem and stated that limitations
on the process of discovering truth in federal trials should be imposed
only when other considerations outweigh the general need for dis-
closure of all relevant evidence.8
In two prior decisions the Court had implied that protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures was more important than suppress-
ing crime by illegal methods.
'The "silver platter" label was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74 (1949). There the Court said, "[A] search is a search by a federal official if
he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured
by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter."
Id. at 78-79.
'Elkins v. United States, 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959).
' "The motion [to surpress] shall 'be made before trial or hearing unless op-
portunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds
for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the
trial or hearing." FFn. R. Calm. P. 41(e).
'"The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained
at'a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social
need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall
not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice."
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24-25, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).
6 See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 387 (1937) (dissenting opin-
ion) ; Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 749, 763-
66 (1933).
" See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ; Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 151 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40,
41 (1949) (dissenting opinions).
'364 U.S. at 216.
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A unanimous Court in Weeks v. United States" held that evidence
obtained by federal officers during an unreasonable search and seizure
in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in a federal
criminal prosecution. However, the Court refused to exclude evidence
obtained by state officers using methods contrary to the fourth amend-
ment because "the Fourth Amendment is not directed to, individual
misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal Govern-
ment and its agencies."10  The Weeks rule was extended by subse-
quent decisions to exclude evidence in federal prosecutions where fed-
eral agents participated with state officers in an unreasonable search and
seizure" or where the state officers acted solely on behalf of the United
States.12
In Wolf v. Colorado13 the Court held that in a state criminal pros-
ecution the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not
require the exclusion of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizeure even though such evidence would be excluded in federal
prosecutions. However, the Court said, "The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause."' 4 Thus the Court recognized
that the federal constitution embraces a right of privacy enforceable
against the states and their agencies. But the Court, granting that ex-
clusion may be an effecive remedy against arbitrary intrusion, said
that the requirements of due process were fulfilled if a state consistently
applied other remedies15 to enforce this basic right.
Because of the continued adherence to the rule that evidence uncon-
stitutionally obtained by state officers was admissible in federal pros-
ecutions, 10 an anomalous situation was created by the Court's decision
- 232 U.S. 383 (1914).20 Id. at 398.
"Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
1" Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). In this case liquor seized
by state officers after an unlawful search of the defendants' automobile was ad-
mitted as evidence against the defendants in federal court where they were tried
for violation of the National Prohibition Act. The Court held it was error to
admit thd evidence. At the time of the search and seizure there was no sugges-
tion that the defendants were committing any state offense; therefore, the state
officers had acted solely on behalf of the United States.
13 338 U.S. 25 (1949). For a discussion of this case, see Allen, The Wolf
Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Ciiil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1
(1950).
14 338 U.S. at 27.
"For example, the victim of an illegal search may have a tort action for
damages against the searching officer. The state may dismiss the offending officer
or prosecute him in a criminal proceeding. In this respect, see Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, at 30-32 n. 1 (1949).
" "My view that the Supreme Court has not overruled the Weeks decision ...
is further reinforced by the fact that seven United States Circuit Courts of Ap-
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in Benanti v. United States.y7 In Benanti the Court held that evidence
obtained by state officers in violation of section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act' s was inadmissible in federal courts even though it
was obtained without assistance from federal officers.' 9 Thus prior
to the principal case the courts excluded evidence obtained solely by
state officers in violation of a federal statute but admitted evidence
which they seized in violation of the Constitution. It would seem that
more effect was given to the statute than to the Constitution. The
Court in Elkins recognized this anomaly and stated that it would be
logically impossible to justify such a policy.20
In the principal case the Court gave several reasons for its decision.
First, exclusion is the only effective way to compel respect for the con-
sfitutional guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Second, the new rule will avoid needless conflict between state and fed-
eral courts because the federal courts will no longer admit evidence
illegally seized by state officers and thereby frustrate the attempt of
the states having the exclusionary rule to preserve constitutional guar-
anties. Third, the new rule will encourage free and open cooperation
between state and federal law enforcement officers. The Court stated
that the old rule "implicitly invites federal officers to withdraw from
such association" since participation by a federal officer in an unreason-
able search conducted by state officers renders evidence so obtained
inadmissible in the federal courts. Fourth, the imperative of judicial
integrity requires that the federal courts should not be "accomplices
in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold."
Lastly, the Court concluded that the Wolf decision had removed the
"foundation" or "doctrinal underpinning" of the Weeks admissibility
rule. The Court stated that the basis of the rule admitting state-seized
evidence was that "unreasonable state searches and seizures12 1 did not
peals and several United States District Courts in the other circuits ... have
continued to adhere to it since and notwithstanding the Wolf decision." United
States v. Blackman, 183 F. Supp. 545, 547 (D.D.C. 1960) (Pine, J.).
I355 U.S. 96 (1957), 37 N.C.L. Rlv. 88 (1958).
18 "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person...." 48 Stat.
1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
2 The Court construed § 605 as requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained
by wire tapping even though the section contains no reference to the admissibility
of such evidence. The first case holding wiretap evidence to be inadmissible in
federal court was Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). However,
in that case the tap was made by federal officers.
20 364 U.S. at 215.
-1 It seems that the Court used the phrase "unreasonable search and seizure"
to mean unreasonable when compared with the standards of the fourth amend-
ment. Weeks founded the admissibility rule on the fact that conduct of state
officers did not violate the fourth amendment even though the same conduct on
the part of federal officers would amount to an unreasonable search and seizure.
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violate the federal constitution. Then the determination in Wolf that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits "arbitrary intrusion by the police"
was interpreted by the Court as meaning the amendment prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers."
Implicit in this conclusion-that Wolf removed the foundation of
the admissibility rule-is the assumption that conduct of state officers
violates the fourteenth amendment if the same conduct on the part of
federal officers would violate the fourth amendment. This was clearly
pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion, and he
stated that the majority was guilty of a "complete misconception of the
Wolf Case."' '
It is important to note that the only question before the Court in
Elkins was the admissibility of evidence. No constitutional question
was necessarily involved. The majority stated, "What is here invoked
is the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts .... 23 In the exercise of this power the
Court, in reviewing convictions in the federal courts, is not confined
to the ascertainment of constitutional validity but may establish civi-
lized standards of procedure and evidence.2 4 Therefore, it would seem
that the Court in the principal case could have reached the same result
without reference to the constitutional question raised by the Wolf de-
cision-whether every "unreasonable search" which violates the fourth
amendment is also an "arbitrary intrusion" which violates the four.
teenth amendment.
The Court in Elkins referred to the experience of the states in adopt-
ing the exclusionary rule and noted that their movement toward this
rule has been hesitant but seemingly unrelenting. The Court also stated
that its decision would not affect the freedom of the states to develop
and apply their own sanctions.2 5 At the present time about one-half
of the states have adopted the exclusionary rule.26 North Carolina ad-
""The identity of the protection of the Due Process Clause against arbitrary
searches with the scope of the protection of the Fourth Amendment is something
the Court assumes for the first time today. It assumes this without explication
in reason or in reliance upon authority, and entirely without regard for the essen-
tial difference, which has always been recognized by this Court, between the
particularities of the first eight Amendments and the fundamental nature of
what constitutes due process." 364 U.S. at 239-40 (dissenting opinion). "The
scope and effect of these two constitutional provisions cannot be equated, as the
Court would have it." Id. at 238. The significance of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
statement that the majority is guilty of a complete misconception of Wolf is more
apparent when it is recalled that he wrote the majority opinion in Wolf.
" 364 U.S. at 216. This power of supervision is embodied in FED. R. CPm . P.
26.
" McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
"This would seem to suppress any idea that the next step by the Court will
be to overrule Wolf and apply the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions.
"0 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960) (app.).
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mitted evidence obtained during an illegal search until 195327 when the
excIusionary rule was adopted by statute.28
Although the Court's consideration of the question of constitution-
ality of state searches and seizures could have best been avoided by
adhering to the policy of deciding a case on other than constitutional
grounds if at all possible,29 its pronouncement, of a rule of evidence
seems sound. The uniformity achieved in federal criminal prosecutions
by applying the same rule regardless of whether the search is by state
or federal officers is wholly desirable.
G. MARLiN EvANs
Torts---Res Ipsa Loquitur-Unexplained Automobile Accidents.
In Lane v. Dorney1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to unexplained
single-car automobile accidents. The plaintiff relied on Etheridge v.
Etheridge2 as holding that res ipsa was applicable to such accidents.
The court stated, however, that the doctrine was not applied in Eth-
eridge.
In Etheridge the defendant was driving along a dirt road at a moder-
ate rate of speed. As the defendant crossed an intersection his car
swerved to the right, ran into a ditch, and turned over. The defendant
offered testimony that he was not able to turn the car back toward the
center of the road for some unknown reason and that his brakes did
not seem to take hold. The court held that the evidence was sufficient
to withstand a nonsuit. Though the words "res ipsa loquitur" were
not used, the court stated the applicable rule to be as follows:
When a thing which caused an injury is shown to be under the
control and operation of the party charged with negligence and
the accident is one which, in the ordinary course of things, will
not happen if those who have such control and operation use
proper care, the accident itself, in the absence of an explanation
by the party charged, affords some evidence that it arose from
want of proper care.... The rule has found limited application
in automobile cases. It applies when the accident is one which
"State v. Vanhoy, 230 N.C. 162, 52 S.E.2d 278 (1949); State v. Simmons,
183 N.C. 684, 110 S.E. 591 (1922); State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 623, 78 S.E. 1(1913).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-27.1 (Supp. 1959).
For a discussion of the use of illegally obtained evidence in state courts, see Note,
33 N.C.L. REV. 100 (1954).
' "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
1250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959).
2222 N.C. 616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943).
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